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Abstract 
In the Anthropocene, human beings are capable of bringing about globally 
catastrophic outcomes that could damage conditions for present and future human life 
on Earth in unprecedented ways. This paper argues that the scale and severity of these 
dangers justifies a new international criminal offence of  'postericide’ that would 
protect present and future people against wrongfully created dangers of near 
extinction. Postericide is committed by intentional or reckless systematic conduct that 
is fit to bring about near human extinction. The paper argues that a 
proper understanding of the moral imperatives embodied in international criminal law 
shows that it ought to be expanded to incorporate a new law of postericide. 
 
Key words: Anthropocene, international criminal law, human extinction, human 
security, global catastrophe, intergenerational ethics. 
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Endangering Humanity: An International Crime? 
 
Global Dangers in the Anthropocene 
We are living in the Anthropocene. This new epoch has been brought about by 
the scientific and technological advances made by our species since the Industrial 
Revolution. In the Anthropocene, people are capable of radically and irreversibly 
altering conditions on the planet in ways that seriously endanger all life on Earth, 
including that of Homo sapiens. The Anthropocene is an age of multiple global 
catastrophic dangers. Examples fall roughly into two categories. In the first, and better 
understood, category of ‘environmental catastrophe’ are global processes and 
outcomes that involve the degradation of the environment, where the mechanisms by 
which catastrophe could happen are known in virtue of sound theory and/or empirical 
evidence. In this category is global warming caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions and land use changes, a nuclear winter in the aftermath of nuclear war, and 
biological and chemical global warfare. In the second, and less well understood, 
category of ‘technological catastrophe’ are dangers for which we have far less 
empirical evidence and/or reliable theoretical knowledge. Examples here can involve 
nanotechnology, AI, synthetic biology, or experiments at facilities such as the Large 
Hadron Collider (LHC) going horribly wrong (Bostrom and Cirkovic 2011). 
Many anthropogenic global catastrophes could impact on non-human life in 
disastrous ways. Damage to non-human life is still not commonly enough 
acknowledged in mainstream philosophical literatures about value in the 
Anthropocene, and nor are there widely practiced techniques of valuation that 
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properly capture the nature and extent of such damage. That said, I shall only focus 
here on dangers to human beings that are created by conduct fit to cause 
anthropogenic global catastrophes. In particular, I shall defend in outline a new 
response to the danger of near human extinction that many global catastrophes could 
cause. 
Despite the fact that the probability of total human extinction in the Anthropocene 
is likely to be low, human activity that could cause the species to go extinct is taken 
seriously as a danger by many experts (Hansen 2011; Rees 2003; Stern 2006; 
Matheny 2007; Posner 2004),1 for at least two reasons. First, human extinction, and 
points on the road to it, are taken to be extremely bad outcomes (Bostrom 2003; 
Auerbach 2015; Jamail 2015).2 And second, it is within our control (at least in theory) 
to address dangers of extinction with anthropogenic as opposed to non-anthropogenic 
causes, in large part because we are able to create these dangers through our own 
conduct: there is much we could do now to prevent global thermonuclear war, but 
little we can do now if an asteroid with Earth’s name on it is hurtling at great speed 
towards us.  
 
1 For example, the Stern Review posited an extinction probability of 0.1 per cent per 
year which is equivalent to a 9.5 per cent risk of human extinction within the next 100 
years (Stern 2006, 47). Subsequently, Stern commented, ‘I got it wrong on climate 
change - it’s far, far worse’ (The Observer, 26 January 2013).  
2 I take it that danger on this scale is not on all fours with common-or-garden 
activities through which we impose reciprocal risk, such as driving a car, and that 
consequentialists and contractualists alike can have good grounds for condemning 
conduct creating global catastrophic dangers (Kumar 2005). 
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It is important to be clear that the fact that we are not in a position to specify 
precisely by how much the probability of extinction is increased by any of our present 
activities is not a barrier to treating these activities as endangering extinction 
(Hansson 2011; Seth 2014). In general, we can often accurately judge an outcome to 
have been made more likely by some conduct without being able to specify the exact 
shift in probability that the conduct has brought about. Moreover, and following 
Henry Shue, I shall assume that when a case exhibits the following three key features 
we ‘can reasonably, and indeed [we] ought to, ignore entirely questions of probability 
beyond a certain minimal level of likelihood’ (Shue 2010: 147): 
 
(1) massive loss: the magnitude of the possible losses is massive; 
(2) threshold likelihood: the likelihood of the losses is significant, even if no 
precise probability can be specified, because (a) the mechanism by which the 
losses would occur is well understood, and (b) the conditions for the functioning 
of the mechanism are accumulating; and  
(3) non excessive costs: the costs of prevention are not excessive (a) in light of the 
magnitude of the possible losses and (b) even considering other important 
demands on our resources (Shue 2010). 
 
As Shue rightly insists, it is possible to make accurate yet imprecise judgements 
that the probability of an outcome has been increased by a given conduct. Most cases 
of conduct fit to bring about near human extinction as a result of anthropogenic global 
catastrophe will have this character. One aim of this paper is to indicate the nature of 
the massive loss that would be instantiated in a state of near human extinction. Given 
that political institutions fit to govern such serious dangers must be well upstream of 
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them, we have a mandate - indeed, an obligation - to address now the question of how 
to govern conduct fit to create a danger of near  human extinction. In this paper I shall 
discuss the global and intergenerational damage to human security that is caused by 
any serious danger of near extinction. I shall argue that faulty conduct fit to 
significantly increase the likelihood of near human extinction beyond Shue’s 
threshold lies within the scope of international criminal law qua system of moral 
ideals, and that this body of law ought to be extended to include a new criminal 
offence of ‘postericide’. Postericide is committed by intentional or reckless conduct 
fit to bring about the near extinction of humanity.  
I shall have nothing to say here about the costs of prevention pursued through 
international criminal law, expanded to include a new law of postericide. And neither 
shall I argue that conduct in any particular case exhibits all the features that would 
qualify it as postericidal. Nevertheless, and in order to fix thoughts, it will be helpful 
briefly to lay out two highly stylised and simplified examples of contexts in which 
postericidal conduct could be found.  
First, consider the case of the Narcissistic President. A businessman with no 
political track record gets elected President of the United States. He has a professional 
track record of bankruptcy, sharp practice, racial discrimination and involvement with 
the mafia, and a personal track record of sexual assault and misogyny. He has an 
extremely narcissistic personality, exhibiting a grandiose sense of entitlement, a need 
for admiration, a lack of empathy, and pompous arrogance. He staffs the White House 
and his Cabinet with inexperienced people drawn from the private sector, many of 
whom hold obnoxious views. As he promised in his divisive and hate-filled 
campaign, he immediately asserts his intention to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris 
Agreement, which is the last slim hope humanity has to avert catastrophic climate 
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change. His view is that climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese for 
economic advantage. He, and his advisors, are climate deniers who ignore scientific 
evidence (McKinnon 2016), including research published just after his election win 
showing that climate sensitivity may have been massively underestimated in previous 
IPCC Reports, with the consequence that temperature rises by 2100 under a ‘business 
as usual’ scenario are likely to be much higher than estimated hitherto: in the range of 
4.78C to 7.36C rather than 2.6C to 4.8C (Friedrich et al 2016). As a consequence of 
the Narcisstic President’s decision, China also withdraws from the Paris Agreement. 
The Agreement limps on but is emasculated and ineffective. The world heats up in 
line with the higher end estimates of climate sensitivity under a business as usual 
scenario, and our grandchildren find themselves in a catastrophic 7C world (Pearce 
2007; Lynas 2008).3 
 Second, consider Unilateral Solar Radiation Management (SRM). SRM is a 
type of geoengineering. Following a prominent report by the Royal Society in 2009, 
geoengineering per se is commonly defined as ‘the deliberate large-scale 
manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate 
change’ (Shepherd et al 2009: 1). SRM techniques tackle the effects of greenhouse 
gas emissions by reducing the extent to which the Earth absorbs solar radiation, thus 
cooling the planet. There are a variety of SRM techniques on the table at present; 
probably the most discussed of these is stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI). SAI 
involves putting vast quantities of reflective particles (e.g. sulphur dioxide or 
specially designed nano particles) into the stratosphere, using fleets of planes, ships, 
or tethered balloons. Imagine that climate sensitivity is at the lower end of the range 
 
3 This ‘imagined’ scenario was written before Donald Trump became President 
Elect of the U.S.A. The reality of his Presidency could, of course, be far worse than 
this scenario. 
 8 
for which we have recent evidence, and that our grandchildren find themselves in a 
4C world under a business as usual scenario in 2100, either as a result of the decisions 
of a long dead Narcissistic President, or of other failures of previous generations to 
mitigate effectively when they still had the time. As the world heated up throughout 
the twenty-first century, a concentrated research group of geoengineering scientists 
worked hard to develop a deployable SAI technology. Their work was heavily, but 
quietly, funded by the world’s largest fossil fuel MNC, with a prescient eye on future 
profits and a willingness to take a punt on an unproven technology. The work fell 
between the cracks of domestic, regional and global governance structures, none of 
which were fit to handle it.4 By 2100, in the face of dangerous climate change, the 
world’s leaders are finally ready to divest from fossil fuels at speed, but need to buy 
time to make this happen. SAI technology is by now ready to deploy and the MNC 
(suitably compensated by states in need) rolls it out. Within a decade, global 
temperatures stabilise, and our grandchildren start to try to make the changes to fix 
the climate, knowing this will take centuries (perhaps longer) to work, if it works at 
all. The work begins, but within 50 years the biggest global financial crash the world 
has ever seen causes the collapse of the MNC, and SAI is abruptly terminated. In the 
SAI deployment period, and despite all the political will, divestment happened 
slowly: the pumping of greenhouse gases had barely slowed down throughout 
deployment. Atmospheric concentrations at the point of termination are so high that 
global temperatures sky rocket to 7C or upwards.  
To emphasise, the point of these examples is not to make it obvious who is at fault 
in performing postericidal conduct, what the fault is, what damage is done fit for the 
 
4 The governance of climate engineering is being addressed by a Report (jointly 
written by an Academic Working Group to which I belong) under the aegis of the 
Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment (http://www. 
http://ceassessment.org/), to be published in 2017. 
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attention of international criminal law (although I shall discuss this below), or at what 
point Shue’s threshold likelihood was passed in each case. All these points raise 
difficult questions that cannot be addressed in this paper (McKinnon: forthcoming 
2018). Instead, the point is that in this phase of the Anthropocene we already have 
contexts in which postericidal conduct could happen. The stylised examples both 
relate to climate change. If climate change were to happen on the scales in the 
examples it would very likely cause the collapse of civilization as we know it and 
propel humanity into a state of near extinction (Oreskes 2013). We know that 
societies of the past have declined and disappeared (sometimes rapidly) as a result of 
having destroyed their own resource base while failing to see clearly that collapse was 
coming and/or by being paralysed with respect to averting it (Diamond 2005). Every 
case is complicated. However, if we think that the local collapses of the past could be 
replicated on a global scale, we should be thinking now about institutions fit to 
prevent these outcomes. Global catastrophic collapse could push the species to the 
brink of extinction: and climate related examples are far from the only ones available 
(Bostrom and Cirkovic 2011; Klein 2015).  
In what follows I shall give an account of what counts as a state of near extinction 
and what is bad about such a state. I shall argue that intentional or reckless conduct 
creating a significant danger of near extinction falls within the scope of international 
criminal law, given our best theories of it as a system of moral ideals.  
 
What is near human extinction? 
To understand what is wrong with conduct creating a danger of near extinction 
we need to understand what is bad about a state of near extinction per se. But before 
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broaching that we need to understand what states of affairs count as near human 
extinction. 
There are at least two dimensions of nearness that are relevant to 
understanding near human extinction: proximity to a numerical threshold and 
proximity in time to an extinction event. A state of near human extinction is one that 
instantiates one, or both, of these properties insofar as they are sufficient for total 
human extinction. Taking each property in turn, near extinction could mean proximity 
to a numerical threshold of human beings below which Homo Sapiens could not 
continue to reproduce effectively. For example, if there is not sufficient genetic 
diversity in a small pool of potential procreators then it might not be possible to avoid 
widespread birth defects that would prevent further successful reproduction. 
However, there are cases in which the number of members per se in a human 
population would not matter for determining whether that population is near 
extinction. The universe could contain very few human beings without Homo Sapiens 
being in a state of near extinction, so long as the conditions in which those humans 
exist are fit to support reliable reproduction. Perhaps, in the future, benign AI could 
manage an artificial environment on Earth or elsewhere that could manipulate human 
procreation through genetic engineering, or some other technology, in a way that 
makes the idea of a numerical threshold redundant.  
A different dimension of nearness to extinction is temporal. Homo Sapiens 
could be in a state of near extinction because the end is nigh: perhaps the LHC will 
tomorrow create a black hole that will simultaneously and instantaneously cause the 
death of every member of the species. In these types of case, numbers do not matter 
for nearness to extinction: in the LHC technological catastrophe there is no decline in 
numbers and Homo Sapiens goes extinct in the blink of an eye. Again, however, there 
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are cases in which temporal proximity to a state of total extinction does not matter for 
nearness either. For millennia our ancestors numbering just a few thousand lived in 
east Africa before migrating across what is now the Red Sea between 90,000 to 
130,000 years ago (Brahic 2012). Of all the populations of the genus Homo that 
coexisted with Homo Sapiens, there was no guarantee that our ancestors would 
survive, let alone expand and become dominant. With numbers of Homo Sapiens as 
low as 2000-5000, disease or environmental catastrophe could have easily wiped out 
this population (Zhivotovsky et al 2003). But this could have been the case without it 
being true that extinction was imminent throughout this period. 
 Finally, a state of near human extinction can be understood in terms of a 
combination of temporal and numerical factors; for example, when numbers of human 
beings are declining very fast in a way that will end in total extinction. What marks 
out all these types of cases is that a mechanism is in operation that has the power to 
propel Homo Sapiens out of existence entirely if it continues to operate. The 
mechanism could do this either by killing individuals (or small groups) sequentially 
until all are dead, or by culminating in an event that will make humans go extinct, or 
both. 
What matters to establishing whether a state is one of near extinction is the 
mechanism by which the state is brought about and/or sustained. In the benign AI 
case there is a mechanism that will enable continued reproduction despite low 
numbers. And in the ancestors case, features of the conditions of life for early Homo 
Sapiens explain why their continued existence could have been precarious despite the 
fact that there was no imminent danger. The way in which to assess whether a state of 
near extinction exists is to consider whether mechanisms are operating in that state 
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that are fit to quickly deplete the global population of human beings, or to kill them 
all in a short space of time. I shall call these ‘extinction mechanisms’. 
This way of understanding near human extinction gives insight into an 
important feature of conduct that creates a danger of near human extinction. This will 
be conduct that either creates a new extinction mechanism, exacerbates an existing 
extinction mechanism, or both.  
 
Is near extinction bad because total extinction is bad? 
Once we know what near human extinction is, we can ask what makes it bad. 
This matters because unless near human extinction is bad, there can be no case to 
make that conduct making near human extinction significantly more likely is 
wrongful in ways that lie within the purview of international criminal law. There are 
two ways of understanding the badness of near human extinction.  
The first ‘derivative’ account has it that the badness of near extinction is 
derived from the badness of total extinction. This is an instance of a more general 
approach to the evaluation of risk which has it that badness of any risk is inherited 
from the badness of the outcome that will come to pass if the risk ripens. Hence: the 
reason why smoking is bad is that it could cause lung cancer. Any conduct that makes 
a bad outcome significantly more likely is ipso facto bad itself, all else being equal.5 
Extinction mechanisms are those that could continue to operate to bring about total 
extinction, and ex hypothesi total extinction is made more likely by the operation of 
such mechanisms, so on this view we need to establish what would be bad about total 
human extinction in order to establish what is bad about near human extinction. 
 
5 This is not beyond dispute. See Jarvis Thomson: 1986. 
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There are at least three ways to argue for the badness of total human 
extinction, all of which are difficult to make convincing. Since my defence of a law of 
postericide does not depend on a derivative account of the badness of near extinction I 
shall not go into great detail here. Briefly, the three ways of argument and their 
challenges are as follows.  
First, total extinction could be bad in a way that exhibits a ‘final value’ 
(Korsgaard 1983).6 A state of affairs (or fact, or object) has final value when it is 
valuable independent of the ways in which it is instrumental to, or otherwise related 
to, other valuable states of affairs. An argument that total human extinction would be 
bad in terms of final value would have to establish that the eternal continuation of 
Homo sapiens would be a good thing in itself, independent of it being good for 
people, other species, or anything else. Perhaps the best bet for making this case is an 
appeal to aesthetic value, but it remains a challenging view to defend. 
The second type of value which could be exhibited by total human extinction 
as a bad outcome is instrumental value, which is a type of extrinsic value. Following 
Michael Zimmerman, ‘[t]hat which is extrinsically good [or bad] is good [or bad] not 
… for its own sake, but for the sake of something else to which it is related in some 
way’ (Zimmerman 2015: 32). Something is instrumentally valuable when it is a 
means to, or the cause of, a distinct valuable thing. To argue that total human 
extinction would be bad in a way that exhibits instrumental value would require 
specifying further distinct values which would be damaged by total human extinction. 
Derek Parfit argues (in part) in this way (Parfit 1986). He invites consideration of the 
comparative badness of three states: (1) peace, (2) a nuclear war that kills 99% of the 
world’s existing population, and (3) a nuclear war that kills 100%. Of these outcomes 
 
6 Korsgaard’s discussion does not address extinction. 
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he says, ‘(2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the 
greater of these differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is 
between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much 
greater’ (Parfit 1986: 453). In support of this claim he appeals to the value of future 
human experiences, and progress in the fields of human knowledge - especially with 
respect to what he calls ‘Non-Religious Ethics’. 
Another type of extrinsic value which could be exhibited by total human 
extinction is inherent in the state insofar as it is related to other valuable things in 
ways that are not instrumental or causal (Zimmerman 2015: 33-4). Samuel Scheffler 
makes this type of argument for the badness of total human extinction (Scheffler: 
2013). The argument is focused on what he calls ‘the afterlife conjecture’: the 
continuation of human life on Earth is a condition for any temporal cohort of people 
valuing their present projects, pursuits and activities. He asks us to imagine a 
‘doomsday scenario’, wherein an asteroid is certain to collide with the Earth and 
destroy it completely 30 days after one's death (Scheffler 2013: 19). He reflects that it 
is plausible to think that we would react to a doomsday scenario by becoming 
emotionally detached from, demotivated to engage in, and deprived of reasons to 
continue with projects, pursuits and activities across the range of human life, from 
large-scale and explicitly future oriented projects (such as finding cure for cancer), to 
every day activities and pleasures. For Scheffler, valuing brings together doxastic, 
deliberative, attitudinal and dispositional states oriented towards the thing that is 
valued. By thinking through what a doomsday scenario would mean for our valuings 
understood in terms of these states, we can see that these valuings depend (non-
instrumentally) on future people coming into existence after our own deaths. 
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Although it is possible to give derivative account of the badness of near 
human extinction that appeals to the badness of total human extinction understood in 
terms of final, instrumental or inherent value, none of these approaches would clearly 
bring conduct creating a significant danger of near human extinction within the scope 
of international criminal law. The moral ideals at the heart of international criminal 
law are unlikely to be expansive enough to address (for example) conduct that brings 
about bad outcomes understood in aesthetic terms (final disvalue), a diminution of 
progress in the fields of human knowledge (instrumental disvalue), or damage to the 
conditions necessary for practices of valuing (inherent disvalue). Derivative accounts 
are all interesting, and some may be true, but they are irrelevant to establishing the 
need for a new law of postericide. The law of postericide does not aim to prevent 
human extinction per se, and the offence of postericide responds to the badness of 
near human extinction in virtue of the damage that would be done to people in this 
state, independent of whether this state is also bad in derivative ways.  
 
Near extinction and human security 
The right focus for justifying a law of postericide is on the badness of near 
extinction insofar as it involves damage to victims of a type already recognised in 
international criminal law. My central claim is that extinction mechanisms would 
cause damage to human security on a catastrophic massive scale, and thus that it is 
legitimate to criminalise faulty conduct that creates or exacerbates the operation of 
such mechanisms making total human extinction significantly more likely. 
Conceptions of human security range along a scale from thin to thick. Thin 
security directs concern to protecting people from ‘threats to life and limb’ only 
(Sorrell 2013, 177). Thick security covers a variety of threats that go beyond threats 
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to life and limb. The thick conception of security is evident in many landmark 
Reports. For example, the 1994 UN Human Development Report presents security as 
embodying a ‘concern with human life and dignity’ and is focused on the importance 
of ‘safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crimes and repression’ (UNDP 
1994).7  
Furthermore, human security is a temporally extended good: what matters for 
security is not just the goods to which people have access at any point in time but also 
whether that access will continue in a reliable way in the future. Being free from the 
threat of physical violence today is of minimal value to me in trying to live my life 
well unless I know that most of my tomorrows will be the same. What matters just as 
much about security is its trajectory. This brings the interests of people not-yet-born 
within the purview of political and social institutions that function well with respect to 
 
7 The Report identifies seven areas in which human security can be damaged: 
1. Economic security, requiring ‘an assured basic income’. 
2. Food security, ‘requiring physical and economic access to food’. 
3. Health security, requiring freedom from disease and access to health services. 
4. Environmental security, requiring protection of the environment and natural 
resources as a habitat for human beings. 
5. Personal security, requiring freedom from violence inflicted by states, groups, 
and individuals. 
6. Community security, requiring the protection of groups - family, ethnic, 
religious etc. - insofar as these groups do not perpetuate oppressive practices. 
7. Political security, requiring the protection and creation of political societies 
that honour basic human rights (UNDP 1994, 25-33). 
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security. Because extinction mechanisms continuously function to sustain a state’s 
numerical or temporal nearness to total extinction, they not only create and/or sustain 
massive damage to human security in a given time slice, but also make it very likely 
that the damage will extend into the near future, and possibly longer: extinction 
mechanisms damage both the achievement and the trajectory of human security.  
Presently existing human beings inhabit a Westphalian world. For us, extinction 
mechanisms could be those fit to destroy the infrastructure of states, and the 
international institutions that bind them together (insofar as they do) in peace. Human 
security is damaged by activity and conditions that affect persons’ and communities’ 
access to fundamental human goods. When states are just, or at least well-ordered, 
they are instrumental in ensuring human security for people within their borders. But 
states can also cause great damage to human security: the ideals of state security and 
human security do not always align (Rothschild 1995). Human security only 
contingently requires a Westphalian world order. If well ordered states are 
instrumental to human security then the arguments I make here also count as 
arguments for protecting the security of well ordered states, which means protecting 
their sovereignty. 
What sort of good is human security? A first thought is that human security is a 
basic human right. For example, Henry Shue sometimes makes this claim. What he 
means by it is that human security a right without which no other rights can be 
enjoyed (Lazarus 2015; Shue 1996). For this to be true we must be able to identify the 
agents holding duties that correlate with the basic right to security (Lyons 1970). 
There are at least two options: individuals or collectives such as states.  
If individuals hold duties that correlate with the rights that all people have to 
security (with a reliable trajectory) then we get some strange looking conclusions. 
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Consider a scenario in which the mechanism of near extinction is the voluntary and 
uncoerced choices of individual people not to procreate.8 Imagine that people become 
convinced en masse by the teachings of the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement 
and that the majority of them simply stop procreating.9 In this scenario humanity 
moves to a state of near extinction within 100 years, and is sustained only by a few 
pockets of procreators who do not follow the VHEM. If individuals hold duties that 
correlate with people’s rights to security, then it looks like we have to make the 
following claims about non-procreators. 
First, we have to claim that non procreators have a duty to procreate that is 
generated by respect for people’s security rights (Lazarus 2015; Waldron 2011, 218-
9).10 Freedom to choose not to procreate is a central liberty right on any account of it, 
in which case assigning a duty to non procreators to procreate in the name of respect 
for the basic right to security generates a serious clash of rights. Although rights can 
clash, and although procreation rights are not beyond question (McMahan 1981),  we 
should try to avoid a moral infrastructure that has such a clash at its heart. Second, 
given that non procreators as well as procreators suffer damage to security as the 
cumulative result of their individual choices, the view implies that non procreators 
have self-regarding duties to procreate so as not to violate their own rights to security. 
It is deeply controversial to think that people have self-regarding duties, and even 
 
8 Thanks to Helen Frowe for first suggesting this case to me. 
9 The VHEM are a real movement. See http://www.vhemt.org/. 
10 This requirement would be an extreme example of what Waldron calls the potential 
‘voraciousness’ of the ideal of security; that is, how the pursuit of security could 
‘skew the balance between security and other important rights in damaging ways’, 
Waldron (2011, 218-9; Lazarus 2015, 439). 
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more controversial to think that these duties are generated by rights they have against 
themselves. This is another reason to reject the claim that non procreators violate 
people’s rights to security in the voluntary extinction scenario.  
The root of the problem with assigning to non procreators responsibility for 
mass violations of the basic right to security is that this approach treats security an as 
individualised good which is degraded by attacks - or the risk of them - on particular 
individuals that would violate their right to security. As Waldron notes in commentary 
on Henry Shue, it is preferable to use a public good model for thinking about security. 
As he puts it, ‘[I]individuals benefit from security (in the enjoyment of their rights) 
not because their own particular security is attended to on a focused one-by-one basis 
but because threats to security in general are removed or reduced by less personalized 
means’ (Waldron 2011, 213). It is debatable whether individuals can have rights to 
public goods (MaCormick 1994; Raz 2000; Reaume 1988). If human security is 
conceived of as the object of a basic right, however, this claim that has to be 
defended. If this claim cannot be defended then we can conceive of the massive 
global and intergenerational insecurity that characterises near extinction scenarios as 
bad because it is (as Waldron puts it) indispensable for the enjoyment of human 
rights, basic and beyond (Waldron 2011). 
Creating a danger of near extinction is not the only way in which human 
security can be damaged on a global and intergenerational scale. For example, a 
tyrannical world government, or desperate inequality between small elites and the 
mass of the world’s poor with respect to survival goods, could also cause such 
damage. The relationship between a state of near extinction and human security 
shares the structure of the relationships between other, more familiar, endangerments. 
For example, that all people have a right to life explains why causing anyone’s death 
 20 
through drunk driving, medical negligence, or use of a firearm is bad. Or: that all 
people have a right to freedom of conscience explains why it is bad to punish anyone 
for apostasy, or to indoctrinate into a religious creed. When we judge a state of affairs 
to be bad we do so by reference to underlying values which also justify such 
judgements of different states of affairs. In the Anthropocene we are, in an 
unprecedented way, capable of bringing about a state of near extinction through our 
own conduct. That other states of affairs could be bad because of the damage done to 
human security in them does not mean we are not justified in treating the state of near 
extinction as a distinct case.  
The examples just given of causing death by drunk driving, medical 
negligence, punishment for apostasy etc. all involve wrongful conduct. With an 
account of the badness of near extinction in hand we can ask whether there could be 
wrongful conduct fit to create a danger of near extinction. Obviously, there is conduct 
fit to create this danger; arguably, this is what defines the Anthropocene. For 
example, the danger we could be in of catastrophic climate change is ultimately an 
effect of human greenhouse gas emissions, created by the conduct of people from 
around 1750 until the present day. This conduct is not wrongful, at least insofar as it 
is performed by ordinary people going about their daily lives. However, there are 
other types of agents, both individual and collective, whose influence in the world 
marks them off from ordinary people, and renders them capable of wrongful conduct 
that could create a danger of near human extinction. I outlined two such cases in the 
Introduction. Those who think these cases are at too great a distance from reality, or 
are the only cases of their type in the Anthropocene, will resist the need for a new law 
of postericide. Assuming (without argument here) that this resistance rests on a blurry 
vision of the world we are in, I shall make the case that wrongful conduct creating a 
 21 
danger of near extinction is properly addressed by international criminal law once it is 
justifiably expanded to include a new law of postericide.  
 
The Criminal Offence of Postericide 
International criminal law should be extended to include a new law that 
criminalises wrongful conduct creating a serious danger of near extinction. I call this 
a law of postericide. Postericide is committed by: 
 
Intentional or reckless conduct fit to bring about the near extinction of 
humanity.  
 
The actus reus for postericide is conduct of a type fit to create a new, or 
exacerbate an existing, extinction mechanism. It is likely that such conduct could only 
be undertaken in a systematic way by group agents such as MNCs or states. Because 
trials under international criminal law assign criminal liability only to individuals, 
principles are required that justify the attribution of criminal responsibility to 
individuals for the postericidal conduct of groups to which they are appropriately 
related. This is the case for nearly all prosecutions under international criminal law: 
postericide is not unusual in this respect. Where the actus reus for postericide differs 
from existing offences is that it specifies the creation of a danger as part of the crime. 
Although the offence of torture gives precedent in international criminal law for 
offences that relate to conduct independent of the outcome brought about by the 
conduct, there is no precedent for crimes of endangerment such as postericide. This is 
not the case in domestic jurisdictions, where ‘inchoate’ offences of risk imposition are 
common; for example, drunk driving, or the sale of hazardous products.  
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Criminal acts under a law of postericide are akin to that of drunk driving or 
dangerous driving. The prosecution of an act as an inchoate criminal offence does not 
depend on showing that the act itself has causal powers fit to impose the danger; all 
that is required is showing that the act is a token of the relevant type. With respect to 
drunk driving, the type will be ‘driving with a blood alcohol content over n’, where n 
is set by looking at evidence that shows the incidence of death caused by driving by 
people with various levels of blood alcohol content, and by judgements about what 
counts as an acceptable level of risk. With respect to postericide, the type will be 
conduct which creates a new, or exacerbates an existing, extinction mechanism. 
Criminalisation of this type of conduct is justified only against the background of an 
argument that extinction mechanisms cause unacceptable damage that is (or ought to 
be) addressed by international criminal law. I argued in the previous section that the 
value of human security (with a reliable trajectory) should figure heavily in an 
account of this damage. 
The mens rea for postericide - the subjective element of the crime that relates 
to the agent’s mental states - is intention or recklessness. When an agent acts with the 
purpose of imposing an impermissible danger on a victim, they act for wrongful 
reasons and attack their victim. When an agent acts recklessly they fail to be guided 
by the right reasons in their conduct imposing an impermissible danger, despite being 
conscious of the impermissibility of the danger and the reasons not to impose it on 
others. Agents acting in this way endanger their victims (Duff 2005). In assessing 
whether an agent is guilty of attacking a victim by acting with a particular purpose we 
need to know the reasons for which the agent did in fact act. In assessing whether an 
agent is guilty of endangering a victim by acting recklessly we need to know the 
reasons to which they ought to have attended in forming their intention to act. 
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All offences under international criminal law as it presently exists have 
intention as a mens rea. However many domestic jurisdictions specify recklessness as 
a mens rea for some criminal offences; for example, carrying a concealed weapon (in 
the US). Furthermore, in some domestic jurisdictions recklessness is a mens rea for 
inchoate crimes; for example, in the UK a person can be guilty of attempted rape if 
they are reckless with respect to the victim’s lack of consent, all else being equal 
(Duff 1995). An implication of my argument for postericide as an inchoate offence 
that qualifies as an attack or as an endangerment is that there are some cases in which 
international criminal law should have more continuity with domestic criminal law. 
There are many conceptual difficulties in the very idea of an offence of 
postericide and there is no hope of working through them in a paper of this length 
(McKinnon: 2018). In particular, I shall say nothing further about the agency 
necessary for postericidal conduct, or its mens rea. Instead, I shall focus on why there 
is a strong case for thinking that international criminal law ought to be expanded to 
include this new offence.  
 
Postericide as an offence under international criminal law 
The moral odiousness of postericidal conduct makes it fit to ‘deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity’ for the reasons related to human security laid out earlier 
(Rome Statute 2002). But the case is deeper than that: our best existing normative 
theories of international criminal law provide principled theoretical reasons for 
incorporating a new offence of postericide into that body of law. I shall outline two 
persuasive theories of the international criminal law as a normative system in order to 
show that a law of postericide has a proper place in international criminal law. These 
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theories focus on human rights, and on the universal norms that bind together the 
community of humanity.11 
First, consider the idea that international criminal law is morally justified as an 
institution fit to protect basic human rights. There are at least two forms of this 
approach which have different levels of commitment to the ‘collective’ element of 
international crimes; that is, the extent to which conduct violating basic rights must 
victimise people as members of a group, or be perpetrated by a group, in order to fall 
within the scope of international criminal law. In order of decreasing commitment to 
the collective element these approaches are: 
 
1. that international criminal law protects people from group based violations of 
their basic human rights, where these violations also harm humanity as a 
whole;  
2. that international criminal law protects people as individuals from basic rights 
violations, where the violations are caused by the widespread and systematic 
conduct of groups;12  
 
 
11 A third approach, not discussed here, is David Luban’s account of international 
criminal law as an instrument for making good the failures of states to perform 
the functions according to which they are justified (Luban: 2004).  
12 There is also a third version of the human rights approach that rejects the collective 
element as a necessary condition for criminalisation under international criminal law 
(Renzo, 2012). Because this approach does not deny that crimes with a collective 
element are the business of international criminal law it does not challenge my 
arguments that postericide ought to be supported by theories of international criminal 
law that focus on human rights, and insist on a collective element. 
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Larry May’s analysis of crimes against humanity draws on (1). May identifies two 
singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for conduct to qualify as a crime 
against humanity. First, that the ‘Security Principle’ is not met; second, that the 
‘International Harm Principle’ is violated. The Security Principle expresses norms 
related to states’ obligations to uphold the physical security and subsistence of their 
individual members. When states fail to do this their sovereignty may legitimately be 
pierced by international criminal law (May 2005). The Security Principle relates to 
obligations that states have to their members with respect to their basic human rights 
(e.g. their rights to liberty, or to be free from severe economic deprivation fit to 
deprive them entirely of subsistence). Although states may be under an obligation to 
respect the whole range of their members human rights (e.g. rights to political 
participation, cultural rights, or rights to equal pay for equal work), May argues that 
the violation of those rights does not justify  legal intervention by the international 
community. For this reason, May calls his Security Principle ‘morally minimalist’ 
(i.e. thin). 
The International Harm Principle states conditions for the criminalisation of 
conduct that satisfies the Security Principle. This is that the conduct must be group 
based insofar as victims are attacked because of their ‘non-individualised 
characteristics’, and must cause serious harm (as specified by the Security Principle, 
i.e. serious violations of basic rights perpetrated by a state or other collective entity) 
(May 2005 83). May thinks that the International Harm Principle enables him to claim 
that an attack on an individual qua member (say) of an ethnic group by (say) a state 
constitutes ‘an attack on humanity itself’ (2005, 121). In support of this, he draws an 
analogy between humanity as a group susceptible to harm and clubs. Just as a club 
has interests in its members not being harmed (because this could damage the 
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reputation of the club, or even threaten its existence) so humanity as a group has 
interests, inter alia in individual human beings not being harmed. 
Prima facie May’s analysis lends support to making postericide an offence 
under international criminal law. Part of what it is for states to uphold their citizens’ 
basic rights is for them to uphold the conditions under which those rights are secure. 
Conduct creating a serious danger of near extinction damages this type of security on 
a global and intergenerational scale. When states (as collective agents) fail to protect 
their members from such insecurity, and/or when other collective agents create such 
insecurity, international criminal law is authorised to pierce state sovereignty.  
This, though, is too quick. May requires that conduct lying in the scope of 
international criminal law harms humanity as a group in virtue of violating people’s 
basic rights (or, I claim, threatening security, which is indispensable for these rights) 
in response to their ‘non-individualised characteristics’. On May’s view not all 
individual rights violations count as harm to humanity as a group. Only those rights 
violations that happen in virtue of an individual’s membership of a group smaller than 
that of humanity as a whole (for example, when an individual is persecuted because 
they are a member of an ethnic or religious group) make the rights violation harmful 
to humanity as a whole.13 But conduct creating a danger of near extinction appears not 
to satisfy this requirement: the conduct affects people insofar as they are human, but 
not insofar as they are of a particular gender, religion, or nationality. On May’s 
account postericide lies outside the scope of international criminal law because its 
victims are not group-based. 
 
13 May admits there could be exceptions, and gives the bombing of Hiroshima as an 
example (2005, 87). 
 27 
This part of May’s account is a weak link and the fact that it would put 
postericide outside the realm of international criminal law does not impugn my 
argument. The key is May’s claim that rights violations count as harm to humanity as 
a group only when they are ‘individuality-denying’ (2005, 86) insofar as victimhood 
depends on having qualities that could not have been autonomously chosen by the 
victim (2005, 85). One problem with this claim is that it is not clear why only some 
violations of basic human rights count as attacks that deny the individuality of 
victims. Assuming that no one would (or could?) autonomously choose to have their 
basic human rights violated why doesn’t every such attack deny the individuality of 
the person attacked by making them a member of a group to which they would 
autonomously choose not to belong, i.e. the group of victims?  In which case, does 
appeal to the interests of humanity as a group add anything (beyond rhetoric) to the 
argument that international criminal law ought to address conduct that is 
individuality–denying? As Altman and Wellman put it with respect to the Nazi crimes 
against Jewish people, ‘[h]arm was done to the humanity of the Jewish victims, but 
that is not to say that harm was done to humanity itself’ (2004, 42).  
The idea that international crimes cause harm to humanity as a group and that 
this can only happen as a result of individuality-denying attacks on people ought to be 
excised from May’s approach. The fact that conduct creating a danger of near 
extinction does not fit with these weakest parts of May’s overall approach is thus no 
criticism. But why would May appeal to the idea of harm to humanity given its 
obvious weaknesses? Altman and Wellman locate this appeal in the need to justify 
universal jurisdiction by appeal to a harm - such as a harm to humanity as a group -  
that crosses borders. On their view, this takes the Westphalian paradigm too seriously 
and delivers an overly conservative vision of the scope of international criminal law. 
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Instead, they think, conceiving of the moral heart of international criminal law in 
terms of protection for basic human rights makes it unnecessary to show the border 
crossing nature of offences to bring them within its scope. 
Altman and Wellman’s alternative model for thinking about the limits of state 
sovereignty under international criminal law draws on a parent-child analogy. Just as 
parents owe it to their children to treat them in certain ways, so states owe their 
citizens basic political and social goods - inter alia, basic human rights. And just as 
we think it is legitimate for external agencies to interfere  with parents who are failing 
to treat their children in morally required ways so we ought to think it is legitimate for 
international criminal law to pierce the sovereignty of states failing to protect and 
respect the basic human rights of citizens. And ‘a state adequately protects basic 
rights when it neither perpetrates nor permits widespread or systematic violations of 
those rights’ (2004, 47). Altman and Wellman have it that what makes international 
crimes heinous is the individual rights violations they involve; they do not appeal to 
the idea of harm to humanity as a group. But they do retain some commitment to the 
collective element of international criminal law because they think that rights 
violations have to be widespread, and will often be systematic, to qualify as 
international crimes.14  
Taking Altman and Wellman’s more sophisticated approach to international 
criminal law as a system for protecting basic human rights generates support for the 
 
14 They deny that systematicity is strictly necessary: failed states do not act 
systematically and can commit international crimes (Altman and Wellman 2004, 48-
9). Here, there is a further contrast with May, who makes systematic conduct (by 
states or state-like organisations) a necessary condition for criminalization in his 
‘ideal model’ of international criminal law (May 2005, 89). 
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incorporation of postericide into this body of law. The danger of near extinction 
severely undermines the security of basic rights for all human beings affected by it, 
and is thus widespread. And conduct fit to create dangers of this magnitude and 
severity will very likely be systematic even in cases where just one person performs 
the act that ignites the danger. 
The second theory of international criminal law that supports a new law of 
postericide focuses on the connection between this body of law and the fundamental 
human values that often appear in justification of its special features. A good way into 
this is to consider what trials do under international criminal law. The institutions of 
international criminal law are decentralised and weak; the trials they enable are not 
steps on the road to world government. Instead, this approach has it, these trials are 
expressive processes: they state a commitment to the moral impermissibility of a 
variety of acts performed ‘under colour of policy’ (Luban 2004 95). Trials under 
international criminal law express the moral horror of the human community at the 
conduct they address and courts conducting trials under universal jurisdiction have 
standing to do this insofar as they give voice to such moral outrage. 
This approach criminal law per se is best developed in the work of Antony 
Duff. He thinks that criminal liability is a form of accountability to a particular 
political community given the public wrong of crime and in the absence (sometimes, 
even regardless) of an excuse or justification. Duff conceives of moral responsibility 
per se as relational in a triadic way: a person is always responsible as something (X), 
for something (Y), to someone or some body (Z). For Duff, moral responsibility (not) 
to do P is generated by roles that a person occupies; that is, by the normatively laden 
description under which she acts at any point in time. Those roles influence to whom 
she is answerable if she fails to do (or does) P (Duff 2009). Criminal responsibility 
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attaches to people insofar as they are citizens of a particular political community. 
People sharing political community are answerable to one another as citizens for the 
commission of acts prohibited by principles of social cooperation making possible 
their shared political life (Duff 2009, 49). Such ‘public’ wrongs are crimes and those 
who perform them are criminally liable on grounds of fault when they lack 
justification or excuse. On this view, criminal law is declarative or communicative: 
‘[i]ts role is not to make wrong what was not already wrong, but to declare that these 
pre-legal wrongs are public wrongs: to declare, that is, not merely that they are 
wrongs […] but that they are wrongs that properly concern the whole polity, which 
should call their perpetrators to public account through the criminal courts’ (2009, 
86). 
The expressive approach to criminal law extends to the international context 
(Duff 2009, 54-5). In this context we are accountable to one another not as members 
of a particular polity but as human beings qua political animals. When states or other 
agents damage conditions necessary for human beings to live together peacefully and 
profitably they are brought within the scope of international criminal law. Given how 
human security is indispensable for people to live decent lives whatever specific roles 
and associated duties they might have within particular polities, the expressive 
approach supports the extension of international criminal law to postericide.  
It is worth noting that Duff’s approach allows for a justification of a law of 
postericide because it captures both what present people owe to future people, and 
what they owe to one another in their future-regarding conduct. Using Duff’s schema 
for accountability to generate an intergenerational account of the wrong of 
postericide: present people are accountable as members of the human political 
community, for conduct creating a danger of near extinction, to future people qua co-
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members of the political community of humanity. On this reading, postericide is an 
intergenerational crime. A second, intragenerational reading is that conduct creating a 
serious danger of near extinction violates obligations that bind together people in the 
same temporal cohort. Part of what it means to owe justice to one another is to secure 
and preserve just institutions for future people: when we fail to do this we do an 
injustice to other human beings existing right now (McKinnon: 2011). Using Duff’s 
schema: present people are accountable as members of the human political 
community, for conduct creating a danger of near extinction, to present people qua 
co-members of the political community of humanity. On this reading, postericide is 
an intragenerational crime.  
 
Conclusion 
My aim here has been to show that the new dangers of the Anthropocene have 
the potential to cause massive global and intergenerational damage to human security, 
and that at least one response we are justified in taking seriously is the extension of 
international criminal law to a new a offence of postericide, all else being equal. It is 
obvious that there is much that must be made equal before the argument is fully 
complete and convincing. For example, I have said next to nothing about what type of 
agency is necessary for postericide, fault-based liability, excuses fit to defeat liability, 
how groups can be agents of postericide, how postericidal dangers are individuated, 
punishment for postericide, or the range of real world cases to which a law of 
postericide might apply. Even if these aspects of a law of postericide can be 
successfully defended in theory it remains an open question whether postericide ought 
to be incorporated into international criminal law as it presently exists. In particular, if 
this would be likely to make international criminal law even more fragile then there 
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may be good strategic reasons for not pushing for reform. Similarly, if the advent of 
an international criminal offence of postericide would prompt those (largely very rich 
and powerful people) engaged in postericidal conduct to go to great lengths to hide 
what they are doing, thereby making the danger of near extinction more serious than it 
would have been without the law, then there is an argument for the status quo. 
Nevertheless a good moral argument at the level of principle for postericide as a new 
international crime raises a question hitherto unasked in international legal theory and 
practice: why not? 
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